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CHAPTER 1  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Background to the Study 
This paper discusses the key challenges faced by Malawi in combating corruption despite its 
having anti-corruption laws and enforcement institutions in place. Corruption in Malawi varies 
from high-level political corruption to petty bribery.1  This paper will focus on political 
corruption.   
The United Nations in 2003 adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) 2  which is aimed at coordinating efforts by States Parties in the fight against 
corruption and related financial crimes such as money laundering. Malawi is a State Party to 
UNCAC, having ratified the convention on 4 December 2007.3 UNCAC requires every State Party 
to have in place systems and structures that would prevent persons from indulging in corrupt 
practices or laundering the proceeds of corruption anywhere in the world. According to Shehu 
                                                          
1     Nawaz F ‘Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Malawi’ (2012) available at 
http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-Malaw/  (accessed  20 
March 2013). 
2      United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
31 October, 2003, and entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
3      United Nations Convention against Corruption ‘UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 24 December 
2012’ available at http:/www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trities/CAC/signatories.html (accessed 26 February 
2013).  
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UNCAC provides a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules for anti-corruption 
implementation, and there is a critical focus on prevention.4  
Malawi has had in place anti-corruption laws and an anti-corruption institution well before the 
inception of UNCAC and its ratification by Malawi in 2007.5  The Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) was 
enacted in 1995 and came into force in 1996.6 The CPA established the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(ACB). The ACB is mandated to investigate, prosecute, prevent, and educate the public about 
corruption. Thus, UNCAC recommendations ought to have just reinforced the national    anti-
corruption measures already in place. However, despite these anti-corruption measures and all 
the efforts by the international community to assist in combating corruption, both   high-level 
political corruption and petty bribery are on the rise in Malawi.7 According to the 2011 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Malawi underperformed with a score of 3 out of 10. In the       
sub-Saharan region, Malawi was number 14 out of the 48 most corrupt countries.8   
Since the inception of the ACB, there has not been even a single successful prosecution of 
corruption cases bordering on high-level political corruption except for very few former public 
officials who had fallen out of favour with the political leadership of the relevant time.9 Neither 
has the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) registered a single success in the area of money 
                                                          
4      Shehu (2005) 224. 
5  Transparency International ‘Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Malawi’ (2012) available at  
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/329_Overview-of_Corruption_and_anti-
corruption_in_Malawi.pdf  (accessed 20 March 2013).  
6       Corrupt Practices Act, Chapter 7:04 of the Laws of Malawi. 
7       Transparency International (2012).  
8      Transparency International (2012). The lower score indicates more corruption. 
9      Hussein (2005) 97. 
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laundering.10 The reasons for this upsurge in corruption levels and ineffective anti-corruption 
enforcement measures can be attributed to lack of political will to combat corruption, 
particularly high-level political corruption.11 One example of lack of political will is the refusal by 
President Joyce Banda to declare her assets upon her assumption of the office of State 
President of the Republic of Malawi.12 This was in contravention of the constitutional 
requirement for the President to declare her assets and liabilities within three months of 
assuming office.13 
There have been serious allegations concerning political corruption.14 However, very few of 
them have been investigated fully. The few cases that have been taken to court include those 
concerning the former Head of State, Bakili Muluzi,15 former Minister of Finance, Friday 
Jumbe,16 and former Chief Executive Officer of the Petroleum Control Commission, Denis 
Kambalame.17  
                                                          
10    The FIU was established in 2007 in terms of the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist 
Financing Act, 2006. 
11    Hussein (2005) 97. 
12      Matonga G ‘JB won’t declare her assets’ The Daily Times, 1 February 2013, available at 
http://www.bnltimes.com/index.php/daily-times/headlines/national/13228-jb-wont-declare-her-assets 
(accessed 24 March 2013); See also ‘What Are You Worth? Malawians Ask New Leader’ NewsdzeZimbabwe 
21 June 2012, available at http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2012/06/what-are-you-worth-malawians-
ask-new.html  (accessed 20 March 2013).  
13     Section 88(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.    
14      Hussein (2005) 97. 
15      Dr Bakili Muluzi v Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau (High Court of Malawi, Constitutional Case No. 8 of 
2005) unreported.  
16      Hon. Friday Anderson Jumbe et al v The Attorney General (High Court of Malawi, Constitutional Case No.1 
and 2/2005) unreported. 
17      Dennis Spax John Kambalame v The Republic (High Court of Malawi, Criminal Case No. 108/2002) 
unreported. 
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The status of the anti-corruption enforcement measures seems to create a breeding ground for 
political corruption. For example, powers to appoint and fire the Director of the ACB are vested 
in the President.18 Further, although powers to prosecute corruption cases lie with the Director 
of the ACB, consent to prosecute has to be obtained from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP).19  This requirement of consent affects effective prosecution of corruption cases, as the 
DPP may either delay or refuse the ACB consent to prosecute.20 This status of the law breeds 
impunity.  
Apart from the selected provisions in the Constitution that require senior public officials to 
declare assets upon assuming public office,21 there is no enforcement law in place to regulate 
such assets declarations. In 2008, the Malawi Law Commission published a Report that                                                       
recommends development of legislation to regulate assets declarations.22 The Commission 
drafted a Bill for the recommended legislation and submitted the Bill to Parliament for 
consideration. To date, the Bill has not been enacted into law, a delay that borders on lack of 
political will. The study, while supporting the need for legislation to regulate assets 
                                                          
18      Sections 5 and 6 of the CPA. 
19      Section 42 of the CPA.  
20     Hussein (2005) 96. In 1999, the DPP refused to grant consent to prosecute a Minister of Education (from the 
ruling party) who was implicated in a multi-million Ministry of Education scam. The DPP also refused to 
grant consent to prosecute the former Attorney General for embezzlement of US$7.6 million. Further, the 
DPP ignored applications by the Director of the ACB to prosecute a former Minister of Local Government 
who was accused of involvement in a national identity card scam in which over US$ 32 million were 
misappropriated.    
21      Sections 88A(3) and 213 of the Constitution. 
22      Malawi Law Commission Report No. 19 (2008) Report of the Law Commission on the Development of  
         Legislation on Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and Business Interests by Public and Elected Officers, 
Gazetted 28 August 2008, available at 
http://www.lawcom.mw/docs/Report_of_Legislation_on_Declaration_of_Assets.pdf (accessed 24 February 
2013). 
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declarations, will seek to establish whether the Bill puts sufficient focus on political corruption. 
Further, lack of legal frameworks to regulate disclosure of assets and finances of political 
parties promotes political corruption.23  
Malawi could have all the necessary laws and institutions, but lack of political will could derail 
or prevent the positive impact to be expected from the laws and institutions. 
1.2 Research Question 
 The question this paper seeks to answer is this: What are the obstacles to the successful battle 
against political corruption in Malawi? As noted above, despite establishing the anti-corruption 
legal and institutional framework and being State Party to international legal instruments such 
as UNCAC, Malawi is experiencing a rise in both political corruption and corruption in general. 
This fact signifies a problem deeper than the anti-corruption legal framework can measure and 
solve single-handedly.  
This paper, therefore, seeks to explore the key obstacles to combating political corruption, and 
to suggest solutions to the problem. The pertinent questions which this paper seeks to answer 
include (a) what are the causes of political corruption? (b) why is it difficult effectively to 
combat political corruption while Malawi has the anti-corruption legal and institutional 
framework? and (c) what are the possible solutions to the problem? 
                                                          
23      Democratic Malawi has witnessed ruling political parties and senior party members amassing wealth, 
without disclosing sources of such wealth. 
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 While discussing the question, this paper will highlight political will as a fundamental element 
in the successful implementation of the anti-corruption measures.  
1.3 Significance of the Study 
There has not been any scholarly writing about Malawi on this subject.24 Political corruption is 
on the rise in Malawi. Its impact on the welfare of the citizenry is devastating. The approach 
towards reforming the national anti-corruption legal and institutional framework taken by the 
donor community, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank seems not to be 
effective. Besides contributing towards literature on this topic, the findings of this study may be 
valuable to Malawi as a country under study, and also to countries from the sub-Saharan 
region, which face similar problems of political corruption.  
1.4 Scope of the research paper 
This study will limit itself to the situation in Malawi.  
1.5 Hypopaper 
This paper’s main hypopaper is that anti-corruption measures cannot be implemented 
piecemeal. Effective and efficient corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing and 
overlapping institutions of accountability. Further, the paramount weapon against corruption is 
political will.25 Combating political corruption can succeed only if political commitment replaces 
                                                          
24       Those who have written about corruption in Malawi did so either as journal article contributions or seminar   
papers. 
25  Abdulai (2009) 387. 
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mere rhetoric. Efficiency and effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions and the relevant 
legal instruments can be achieved only when some spectrum of independence is guaranteed 
and political meddling is eliminated. In other words, there must be a legal environment that will 
make politicians and other public officers perceive a substantial risk of losing office and having 
illegally acquired property forfeited if they engage in corrupt conduct.26  Thus, the paper will 
analyse what laws and institutions ought to be in place for the successful implementation of 
UNCAC standards and a successful battle against corruption.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
This is a desktop study. This paper will use a qualitative research methodology in order to 
establish the root cause of political corruption, its impact on the socio-economic welfare of the 
people of Malawi, and find out the possible solutions to curbing the mischief. This involves 
reading and analysis of primary sources such as international conventions, memoranda of 
understanding, official reports, national laws and case law. The secondary resources will range 
from books and articles through journal articles and conference papers to electronic resources. 
 1.7 Chapter Outlines 
This paper comprises five chapters. The remaining chapters are as follows; 
 
 
                                                          
26        Fostering institutions to contain corruption, available at 
http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINT/Res/PREMnote24.pdf (accessed 20 March 2013). 
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Chapter 2 
This chapter will deal with the concept of political corruption. Then it will discuss the 
international anti-corruption legal framework and Malawi’s national anti-corruption legal and 
institutional framework.  
Chapter 3 
This chapter will discuss the causes and effects of political corruption in Malawi.  
Chapter 4 
This chapter will explore the key obstacles to combating political corruption. It will also discuss 
the possible roots of the obstacles. The chapter will further discuss what needs to be done for a 
successful fight against corruption.  
Chapter 5  
This chapter will comprise a general conclusion of the paper and recommendations. The 
recommendations will be made in the light of the recommendations in the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of what political corruption is and how it is being combated. 
First, it highlights what corruption is all about. It then defines and discusses the concept of 
political corruption. Thereafter, an operational definition of political corruption used in this 
paper is provided, followed by a discussion of the anti-corruption legal framework at both 
international and national levels.   
2.2 Definition of corruption in general 
Corruption has been defined differently in literature and in various legal instruments. According 
to Gardiner, the diversity in definitions is due to the way corruption is defined in official laws of 
nations, by public opinion or the way it is understood to affect the public.27 This has resulted in 
some international instruments, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), avoiding defining corruption altogether and adopting the descriptive approach to 
definition instead.28 However, the Southern African Development Community Protocol against 
Corruption (SADC Protocol)29 has a comprehensive definition of corruption.  
 
                                                          
27         Gardiner (2001) 25. 
28        Chapter III of UNCAC. 
29  SADC Protocol, entered into force on 6 July 2005. 
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Besides describing specific corrupt practices in its Article 3, the SADC Protocol defines 
corruption as: 
“any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other behaviour 
in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and 
private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, private 
employees, independent agents,  or other relationships of that kind and 
aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.”30 
This definition covers corruption both in the public and private sectors. However, the concepts 
of corruption in most literature are associated with corrupt practices involving public officials. 
For example, the World Bank defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private 
gain”,31 thus leaving out corrupt practices in the private sector.     
According to Shah,32 there are four types of corruption. First is petty or bureaucratic corruption 
representing isolated practices by low-ranking individual public officials abusing their offices by 
demanding bribes or kickbacks or awarding favours in return for personal benefit.33  Second is 
state or regulatory capture and influence peddling. Here public officials collude with private   
actors or politicians for mutual private gain. The private sector captures the government for its 
own purposes.34 Third is patronage, paternalism and clientelism, where public officials abuse 
their offices by ensuring that colleagues, relations or friends of the same geographic area or 
                                                          
30         Article 1 of the SADC Protocol. 
31         The World Bank (1997) 8. 
32         Shah (2007) 234. 
33         Shah (2007) 234. 
34        Shah (2007) 234. 
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ethnic or cultural origin receive preferential treatment in their dealings with the public sector.35 
Fourth is grand corruption, understood as embezzlement or abuse of vast amounts of public 
resources by state officials, usually comprising the political or administrative elite.36  
This paper reduces the types of corruption illustrated by Shah to two: (a) petty or bureaucratic 
corruption and (b) political corruption composed of patronage, paternalism and clientelism, 
and state capture. Political corruption, the subject of this paper, is discussed below. 
2.3 Definition and concept of political corruption 
 Political corruption is based on two concepts: the public office and the public interest.37 The 
working definition of political corruption for this paper is: the subversion of national laws and 
institutions by political leaders with the aim of increasing wealth and power.38 
What is clear from the working definition above is that political corruption involves the          
subversion of the public interest by private interests.39 While “public interest” entails the 
existence of a society, “public official” suggests the existence of a government. Public official is 
defined as: 
“any person in the employment of the State, its agencies, local authorities, or      
parastatals and includes any person holding office in the legislative, executive or judicial 
                                                          
35        Shah (2007) 235. 
36        Shah (2007) 234.  
37        Gardiner (2001) 25. 
38  Hodess (2004) 12. 
39        Philp (2001) 45. 
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branch of a State or exercising a public function or duty in any of its agencies or           
enterprises.”40  
The establishment of a government is an act of society to further the common good.41 Thus, 
public officials exist to serve the community. They are trustees of the common good, and rules 
and regulations are promulgated to monitor how government serves society.  This is a principle 
entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. In this respect, the Constitution 
stipulates that “all legal and political authority of the State derives from the people of Malawi 
and shall be exercised in accordance with the Constitution solely to serve and protect their   
interests”. 42 
However, due to inducement the public official abuses his or her office in return for private 
gain. The inducement may come in different forms. Firstly, the public official may induce 
himself or herself, for example, by abusing discretionary powers.43 Secondly, external forces 
such as the private sector or political party leadership, or forces from within the structures of 
the public office may induce the official to indulge in corrupt practices. Thus, the public official 
is enticed to subvert the law and legal institutions to serve private interests at the expense of 
public interests.  
According to Mbaku, among the motives for political corruption is building and strengthening 
political interests, such as promoting a political party, as well as assisting politicians to “capture 
                                                          
40        Article 1 of the SADC Protocol. See also Article 2 of UNCAC and Article 1 of the AU Convention. 
41       Van Klaveren (1989) 26.   
42        Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
43        Mbaku (2007) 74. 
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and retain leadership”.44 As will be discussed in chapter three, this may be achieved by          
rewarding political supporters, friends and family members through subversion of legal 
procedures in recruitment and procurement of goods and services. Thus, in the absence of    
self-inducement, the public official is induced to take actions which favour whomever provides 
a reward, thereby compromising the public interest.45  
Political corruption may be prevalent in an environment where there is a monopoly of power 
and discretion in decision-making in the absence of accountability.46 While the behaviour      
includes bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of public resources, the gain may take many 
forms, such as monetary reward, rapid promotion, or even security of a job. The gain may be 
personal to the public official, but sometimes it may benefit a family member or other entity 
such as a political party.47 Thus, instead of the resources serving the public interest, they are 
diverted in pursuance of private political interests. 
2.4 Legal framework 
This section discusses the anti-corruption legal framework at both international and national 
levels. The discussion is limited to issues relevant to political corruption. The relevant 
instruments discussed are UNCAC, the AU Convention,48 and the SADC Protocol. At the 
                                                          
44        Mbaku (2007) 12. 
45         Friedrich (2001) 15. 
46        Babu (2006) 5. 
47        Nye (2001) 284, defines nepotism as “bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than 
merit”; Bayley (1989) 936, defines a bribe as a “price, reward, gift or favour bestowed or promised with a 
view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct especially of a person in a position of trust, such as a 
public official”. 
48  The AU Convention entered into force on 11 July 2003. 
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international level, regulation of political corruption takes centre stage. Malawi is a State Party 
to all the three instruments by virtue of signing them, and is bound to them by               
ratification. 
2.4.1 International legal framework: UNCAC, the AU Convention and the SADC Protocol 
The transnational nature of corruption was the cause of the international community 
developing legal instruments, such as UNCAC, the AU Convention and the SADC Protocol, for 
combating corruption.49 UNCAC is rated as the first comprehensive and most important anti-
corruption legal instrument with a global scope of application.50 Unlike UNCAC, the AU 
Convention is of continental force, whereas the SADC Protocol applies to the Member States of 
the SADC region.  
2.4.2 Purposes of the instruments 
The underlying theme of the instruments is the promotion and strengthening of measures   
seeking to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively, as well as            
safeguarding the rule of law and good governance.51  The anti-corruption consensus is that the 
effective fight against political corruption requires a comprehensive set of standard measures 
and rules that all countries ought to implement in order to strengthen their anti-corruption 
regulatory frameworks.52 The measures include (a) development of anti-corruption          
mechanisms at the national level, (b) promotion of co-operation in the fight against corruption 
                                                          
49  Shehu (2005) 221. 
50        U4 Anti-Corruption Resource (2011) 1. 
51        Articles 1 and 5 of UNCAC, Article 3(1) of the AU Convention, Preamble to the SADC Protocol. 
52   Shehu (2005) 224. 
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by States Parties, and (c) harmonisation, to the extent possible, of anti-corruption national     
legislation and policies of the States Parties.53  Below are some of the key measures relevant to 
combating political corruption. 
 2.4.2.1 Criminalisation and law enforcement 
The instruments require States Parties to establish criminal offences to cover the acts of 
political corruption.  They recommend the criminalisation of corrupt practices such as bribery, 
embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, concealment, 
laundering of the proceeds of corruption and obstruction of justice.54 These corrupt practices 
are at the heart of political corruption, and their criminalisation would make public officials 
perceive a substantial risk that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will be prosecuted and 
imprisoned, lose their offices, and forfeit wealth acquired illegally.55 
Malawi, as will be discussed below, criminalises all the offences listed above. Criminalisation of 
these offences is targeted at public officials who are susceptible to political corruption. 
2.4.2.2 Establishment of permanent anti-corruption institutions 
The instruments stipulate the need for States Parties to establish anti-corruption institutions 
responsible for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corruption.56 Such specialised 
                                                          
53   Article 1 of UNCAC, Article 2 of the AU Convention, Article 2 of the SADC Protocol. 
54        Chapter III of UNCAC, Articles 5, 6, and 8 of the AU Convention, Articles 1 and 3 of the SADC Protocol. 
55   “Fostering institutions to contain corruption” available at 
http//:www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINT/Resources/PREMnote24.pdf (accessed 20 March 
2013). 
56        Article 6(1) of UNCAC, Article 5(3) of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
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institutions with well trained staff are justified because of the serious nature of corruption and 
its harmful effects on the social, political and economic well-being of societies. Besides           
establishing the specialised institutions, the instruments further require States Parties to accord 
such institutions necessary operational independence from political meddling.57 The institutions 
must be available readily to monitor the conduct of public officials, and detect and prosecute a 
corrupt public official irrespective of his or her status in society.58  
It is the availability of independent anti-corruption institutions that ensures that the              
cost-benefit ratio for a public official of obeying the law is higher than that of behaving            
corruptly.59 Thus, the institutions must be capable of enforcing the rule of law, thereby          
discouraging a public official from engaging in corrupt conduct unless the official is prepared to 
lose his or her employment, forfeit illicitly gained wealth and even go to prison.60   
2.4.2.3 Codes of conduct and declarations of assets 
The instruments recommend the development of codes of conduct to regulate the ethical      
behaviour of public officials in the course of performing their duties.61 One of the standard 
clauses in such codes of conduct requires public officials to declare any gifts or any advantage 
they receive in the course of performing their duties. Such provisions help in keeping officials 
                                                          
57   Article 6 of UNCAC, Article 5(3) of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
58  Hope (2000) 36. 
59   “Fostering institutions to contain corruption”. 
60  “Fostering institutions to contain corruption”. 
61        Article 8 of UNCAC, Article 7(2) of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(a) of the SADC Protocol.   
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on guard against corruption.62 The AU Convention further prescribes the creation of internal 
committees to monitor implementation of the codes of conduct.63  
Besides the codes of conduct, UNCAC and the AU Convention recommend that States Parties 
enact legislation prescribing declarations of assets for public officials and their close relatives.64 
An effective law in this regard enhances transparency of the finances of officials, and improves 
accountability. It further deters illicit enrichment.65  
This paper will argue that legislation prescribing codes of conduct and declarations of assets 
must not apply only to lower ranking public officials, but extend to politicians as well, including 
heads of state, as they are the most prone to corrupt practices.  
2.4.2.4 Recruitment and procurement of goods and services 
The instruments further recognise the process of procurement of goods and services, as well as 
recruitment of public officials, as being sites of corruption. Corruption in this instance includes 
awarding government procurement contracts and recruiting and promoting public officials on a 
patronage basis.66 In pursuit of the ideal of according every person equal opportunity to 
economic activity, the instruments require that public procurement and recruitment processes 
be transparent, equitable and efficient.67 While recruitment includes promotion to lucrative 
grand office, corruption in procurement would include awards of high value contracts, for 
                                                          
62        Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 92. 
63   Article 8(5) of UNCAC, Article 7(2) of the AU Convention.  
64  Article 7(1) of AU Convention.  
65   Diminio & Kpundeh (1999) 9. 
66  Transparency International “Country Study Report: Malawi” (2004) 24. 
67        Article 7 of UNCAC, Article 3 of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(b) of the SADC Protocol. 
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example, contracts for the supply of educational materials or medical drugs and contracts in the          
construction industry. Thus, there is a need for legislation to prescribe transparency,            
competition and objectivity in decision-making in relation to both recruiting officials and   
awarding procurement contracts.68 
2.4.2.5 Access to information 
Excessive secrecy in governmental operations is another cause of political corruption.69 Secrecy 
enables public officials to commit corruption undetected.70 Thus, the instruments require 
States Parties to have laws in place that will promote easy access to information.71 Easy access 
would enable the public to monitor government operations, and thereby help to eliminate    
opportunities for corruption.72 The rationale of the right to information is to empower any    
person affected by any decision of government to ask to be furnished with reasons for the    
decision, and access to documentation that formed the basis of the decision. This would      
promote transparency and accountability, and thereby curb arbitrary and corrupt practices.73  
 Thus, an active and effective role for civil society in the fight against corruption can be achieved 
through measures ensuring that both civil society and the public have effective access to        
information.74  
                                                          
68  Article 9 of UNCAC, Article 7 of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(b) of the SADC Protocol. 
69        Article 5 of UNCAC, Article 3(3) of AU Convention, Article 4(1)(d) of the SADC Protocol.  
70        Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 96. 
71   Article 13 of UNCAC, Article 9 of the AU Convention, Article 4(1)(d) of the SADC Protocol. 
72        Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 97. 
73        Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 97. 
74        Articles 5 and 13(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
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2.4.2.6 Regulation of political party financing 
In developing countries, particularly in Africa, many democratic governments fail to distinguish 
between state and ruling party governance.75 Ruling parties, therefore, end up surviving on    
national resources, albeit illegally and to the detriment of the public interest.76 To curb this         
malpractice, UNCAC and the AU Convention recommend that States Parties enact legislation for 
the regulation of political party funding.77 While Article 7(3) of UNCAC is persuasive, Article 10 
of the AU Convention is mandatory.  
This paper, as will be discussed below, observes that Malawi is in breach of Article 10 of the AU 
Convention. This breach facilitates abuse of office by high-level leadership and its ruling party.   
 2.4.2.7 International co-operation and asset recovery 
Fighting corruption hardly can be successful if corrupt public officials are permitted to consume 
proceeds of their criminal conduct with impunity. Hence, the need for anti-corruption measures 
promoting international co-operation among States Parties to enable smooth and swift          
recovery and repatriation of proceeds of corruption to their country of origin.78 A public official 
will have no motivation to acquire property corruptly if there will be no safe haven for 
laundering the property.  Thus, for example, Malawi should be able to secure wealth allegedly 
illicitly acquired and secreted in Australia, Singapore, and the Isle of Man by late former 
President Bingu wa Mutharika, to avoid dissipation while investigations and asset recovery 
                                                          
75   Hope & Chikulo (2000) 2. 
76  Hope & Chikulo (2000) 2. 
77  Article 7 of UNCAC, Article 10 of the AU Convention. 
78  Chapter IV of UNCAC, Articles 15,16 and 19 of the AU Convention, and Articles 8, 9, 10 of the SADC Protocol. 
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proceedings are    under way.79 International co-operation extends to extradition requests for 
any fugitive corrupt public official. 
2.4.2.8 Technical assistance and information exchange 
Effective implementation of anti-corruption measures in developing societies adversely          
affected by political corruption is not easy. Implementation of the measures thus requires 
technical assistance ranging from necessary equipment to training, not only of law enforcers 
such as the investigators, prosecutors and the judiciary, but also of civil society and society 
generally.80   
Technical assistance, if applied to an area in critical need, is an effective tool for combating    
political corruption.  
In summary, the instruments are aimed at complementing, co-ordinating or harmonising       
actions of States Parties in combating corruption in their jurisdictions. They provide          
benchmarks by which the effectiveness of state actions can be evaluated.81 The leader in the 
fight against political corruption remains the State Party itself, which is established to serve the 
public interest. 
2.4.3 Malawi’s National Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
Enactment of national anti-corruption legislation has its foundation in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Malawi. This section discusses the relevant constitutional provisions that ought to 
                                                          
79        Nyirongo ‘Bingu was worth more than K61 bn’ The Nation, 2 July 2013.  
80    Shehu (2005) 224. See also Chapter VI of UNCAC and Article 18 of the AU Convention. 
81        Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 89. 
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be implemented for an efficacious fight against political corruption. Thereafter comes a         
discussion of the Corrupt Practices Act and the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau.  
2.4.3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 
The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi came into force on 17 May 1995, marking the birth 
of democracy in Malawi after three decades of one-party rule.82  Section 12 outlines the    
founding principles of the Constitution. These principles provide, inter alia, that: 
“(a)  all legal and political authority of the State derives from the people of Malawi and  
shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution solely to serve and protect 
their interests;  
(b) all persons responsible for the exercise of powers of State do so on trust and shall 
only exercise such power to the extent of their lawful authority and in accordance 
with their responsibilities to the people of Malawi;   
(c)  the authority to exercise power of State is conditional upon the sustained trust of 
the people of Malawi and that trust can only be maintained through open,           
accountable and transparent Government and informed democratic choice.”83  
It has been noted that section 12 embodies the public trust theory, the social trust theory, and 
the principle of participatory democracy.84 The public trust and social trust theories entail that 
those who govern do so not for personal interest but on trust, for the interest, well-being and 
preferences of the governed. Participatory democracy entails individual participation by citizens 
in political decisions and policies that affect their lives, especially directly rather than through 
                                                          
82        Madise D “Challenges in the Fight Against Corruption in Malawi: Some Thoughts” (2007) available at 
http://www.uneca.org/dpmd/events/corruption/Malawi.pdf. (accessed 17 June 2013). 
83        Section 12(1) of the Constitution. 
84        Kuwali (2012) 143. 
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elected representatives.85 Thus, the government is not an end in itself but only a means to fulfil 
the public interest.86  
The Constitution proceeds to prescribe principles of national policy in section 13. Here, the 
state is mandated to promote the welfare and development of the people of Malawi by       
progressively adopting and implementing policies and legislation aimed at achieving the goals 
enumerated in section 13. Among the goals are (a) economic growth and (b) public trust and 
good governance. Economic growth is to be achieved through the nurturing of a market     
economy and long-term investment in health, education, economic and social development.87 
Public trust and good governance are to be achieved by measures which will guarantee          
accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity.88 All this is aimed at    
curbing conflict between duty and self-interest for a public official.  
To achieve good governance, the Constitution separates the powers of the executive,             
legislature, and the judiciary.89 In principle, these arms of government provide checks and     
balances.90 To guard against illicit enrichment, the Constitution requires the Presidency,     
members of cabinet, members of Parliament, and other senior public officials to disclose their 
assets, liabilities and business interests within three months of their election or appointment to 
                                                          
85  Marquette (2001) 396. 
86        Van Klaveren (1989) 26. 
87        Section 13(n) of the Constitution. 
88        Section 13(o) of the Constitution. 
89        Sections 7, 8, 9 of the Constitution. 
90        Nkhata MJ “Origins and Historical Development of the Constitution’’ 13 available at 
http://www.web.up.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/Malawi.pdf. 
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office.91 In order to guard effectively against corrupt practices, section 37 accords every person 
a right of access to all information held by the state insofar as such information is required for 
the exercise of the person’s rights. Access to information is important in the fight against      
corruption, as already noted.    
Malawi’s parliamentary system is modelled after that of the United Kingdom, including its     
parliamentary committees.92 The committees are designed to oversee Parliament, providing 
checks and balances, and thereby complementing the formal work of the Anti-Corruption       
Bureau.93 Among the committees are the Public Accounts Committee and the Public               
Appointments Committee, whose respective primary duties are ensuring the government’s    
accountability in financial matters and recruitment of senior public officials. The Public           
Accounts Committee, for example, is mandated to hold public hearings and quiz accounting   
officers or departmental heads on expenditures of their respective departments. 
It must be noted, however, that almost two decades after the Constitution has come into force, 
government has not promulgated legislation to enforce its fundamental principles. There is no 
law to regulate the declaration and monitoring of assets of public officials, and there is no      
legislation to enforce citizens’ rights of access to information. There is not even legislation to 
regulate financing of political parties. As is discussed in the chapters following, this lacuna in 
legislation fuels political corruption.  
                                                          
91        Sections 88A(1) and 213 of the Constitution. 
92       Patel et al (2007) 5. 
93       Patel  et al (2007) 33. 
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Among the laws enacted in pursuance of transparency, accountability and financial probity are 
the Corrupt Practices Act, the Public Procurement Act and the Public Finance Management Act.  
2.4.3.2 The Corrupt Practices Act  
The Corrupt Practices Act (CPA)94 came into force in 1995. It established the Anti-Corruption 
Bureau which became operational by 9 February 1998.95 The CPA does not define corruption in 
general, nor does it define political corruption. However, section 1 does define “corrupt 
practice” to mean: 
“(a)  the offering, giving, receiving, obtaining or soliciting of any advantage to influence 
the action of any public officer or any official or any other person in the discharge 
of the duties of that public officer, official or other person; 
(b)  influence peddling; 
(c)      the extortion of any advantage.” 96  
This definition is very narrow as compared to the definition of corruption in the SADC 
Protocol.97  However, Part IV of the CPA comprises detailed corruption offences. Section 24         
criminalises soliciting, offering and acceptance of bribes. Sections 25, 25A and 25B criminalise 
abuse or misuse of office. Sections 25C and 25D regulate the conduct of public procurement 
officers. Fraudulent disclosure of information related to tenders, and failure by the officer to 
declare interest and recuse himself or herself from handling any procurement processes        
affected by such interest, are criminalised. Like article 20 of UNCAC, section 32 of the CPA 
criminalises possession of unexplained property. Further, section 36A empowers a court of law 
                                                          
94   Chapter 7:04 of the Laws of Malawi. 
95        Madise (2007) note 83. 
96        Section 1 of Corrupt Practices Act defines “public officer” to include the President, a Vice-President, a 
Minister, and a Member of Parliament.   
97        Article 1 of the SADC Protocol. 
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to authorise the Anti-Corruption Bureau to trace property reasonably linked to corruption. 
Most importantly, besides other sanctions prescribed by the CPA,98 forfeiture of any property 
or wealth connected with corruption is mandatory.99  Finally, section 51A provides for the    
protection of whistle-blowers. 
2.4.3.3 The Anti-Corruption Bureau: institutional framework  
The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) comprises the Director, Deputy Director and other              
employees.100 The President appoints both the Director and Deputy Director of the ACB. Such 
appointments, however, are subject to confirmation by the Public Appointments Committee of 
Parliament.101 The appointments are on terms and conditions deemed fit by the President. 
There are no prescribed qualifications for the positions of Director and Deputy Director, as the 
law merely requires the officials to be of “high integrity and qualifications and training”         
necessary for the posts.102 
The President has powers to suspend from office or terminate the services of the Director or 
Deputy Director for inability to discharge duties or for misbehaviour. Of course, the decision to 
terminate services is subject to confirmation by the Public Appointments Committee.103 While 
                                                          
98        Section 40 of the CPA. 
99  Section 37 of the CPA. 
100      Section 4(1) of the CPA.  
101      Sections 5 and 7 of the CPA. 
102      Section 6(1) of the CPA. 
103      Section 6(2) of the CPA. 
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the other officials of the ACB are appointed on terms and conditions approved by the President, 
their appointments do not require the confirmation of the Public Appointments Committee.104 
2.4.3.3.1 Functions of the ACB  
The ACB’s objectives include protection of Malawi from the dangers that can be caused by    
corruption and any related crimes, such as money laundering and tax evasion. In order to 
achieve this task, the CPA prescribes a three-pronged approach for the ACB to combat            
corruption, namely, (a) corruption prevention through public education, (b) investigation, and 
(c) prosecution.105  
2.4.3.3.2 Independence and accountability 
As noted above, powers to appoint and to dismiss the Director and Deputy Director of the ACB 
vest in the President. Under section 4(4) of the CPA, it is mandatory for the Director to report to 
the   President and to the Minister of Justice on the general conduct of the business of the ACB,    
although the CPA prescribes non-interference in the operations of the ACB. Such conduct of 
business includes findings of investigations.106 
Further, the independence of the ACB is limited by the fact that section 42 of the CPA requires 
the Director to seek the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to prosecute any 
corruption-related cases. Although the law requires the DPP to furnish reasons to the Director 
of the ACB for denial of consent,107 this requirement limits the powers of the ACB, and also   
                                                          
104      Section 9 of the CPA. 
105      Section 10 of the CPA. 
106      Section 10(4) of the CPA. 
107      Section 42 of the CPA. 
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undermines the rule of law.108 In 1999, for example, the ACB could not prosecute the former 
Minister of Local Government involved in a US$ 32 million national identity cards scam because 
the DPP refused consent.109 Again, the DDP denied the ACB consent to prosecute the former 
Attorney General alleged to have embezzled US$ 7.6 million.110  Recently, the ACB failed to 
prosecute Floyd Mondiwa, Deputy Manager of the Malawi Housing Corporation, alleged to 
have benefited corruptly from the US$ 690 789 loss arising from the sale of houses to            
politicians, due to refusal of consent by the DPP. The Blantyre Magistrates’ Court thus             
discharged the accused from criminal prosecution for want of prosecution by the ACB. 111  
This paper argues that this limited independence, coupled with a lack of other relevant               
legislation, has affected the fight against political corruption in Malawi seriously. As discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, politics influences the operations of the ACB. 
2.4.3.4 Public Finance Management Act and Public Procurement Act 
The Public Finance Management Act112 comprehensively prescribes procedures for the           
disbursement of public funds, accountability for the funds, as well as disciplinary measures for 
offences proscribed under the Act. Besides the checks of expenditures through Parliament, the 
Act further provides for checks through auditing by the Auditor General.113  
                                                          
108      Hussein (2005) 96. 
109      Hussein (2005) 96. 
110      Hussein (2005) 96 
111      ‘Court discharge Mondiwa in Malawi housing scam’ Nyasa Times, February 2013. 
112   Chapter 37:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
113   Section 83(2) of the Public Finance Management Act. 
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The Public Procurement Act114 regulates comprehensively public procurement of goods and 
services.115 The Act establishes a specialised entity, the Office of the Director of Public           
Procurement (ODPP), with supervisory powers over public procurement.116 
However, despite the existence of these two statutes, there is a lack of political will to enforce 
them effectively, as evidenced by rampant political corruption perpetrated through public    
procurement and weak financial controls.117  
2.5 Summary 
Given the evils of corruption, there are initiatives at international, continental and regional, as 
well as national levels, to prevent and fight corruption. UNCAC is the most powerful                
international agreement representing the international community. It has been observed that 
UNCAC, the AU Convention and the SADC Protocol place considerable focus on combating    
public corruption.  The theme running across these international agreements is that prevention 
is the best tool for combating corruption, and corruption preventive measures must encompass 
those aimed at promoting good governance, transparency and accountability. Such measures 
include safeguarding the right of access to information, declarations of wealth by public         
officials, enactment and strict observance of codes of conduct, regulation of political party 
                                                          
114  Act No. 8 of 2003. 
115  Preamble to the Public Procurement Act. 
116  Sections 4, 5, 6 of the Public Procurement Act. 
117  Report of the Auditor General on the Accounts of the Government of the Republic of Malawi for the Year 
ended 30th June, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
funding, as well as the establishment of anti-corruption monitoring and law enforcement     
bodies. 
While the Constitution prescribes the fundamental principles of good governance which include 
transparency and accountability, such principles have not been implemented at all. For          
example, since the Constitution came into force, almost two decades ago, no laws have been 
enacted for the enforcement of the right of access to information, the declarations of wealth by 
public officials, and the regulation of political party funding. 
The CPA mandates the ACB to lead the fight against corruption. The CPA criminalises most of 
the core corruption offences. Thus, Malawi has the necessary legal framework to combat      
corruption. Although the CPA provides for the operational independence of the ACB, such      
independence is obstructed by both political interference as well as the legal requirement that 
the ACB be accountable to the President and Minister of Justice. Further, the fact that its 
prosecutorial powers are conditional upon the consent of the DPP limits the independence of 
the ACB. It has been observed that political corruption is on the increase despite the enactment 
of    comprehensive legislation and the establishment of institutions responsible for public 
finances and public procurement. These developments smack of a lack of political will to 
combat political corruption.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN MALAWI 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how political corruption affects Malawian society. It focuses on the 
causes of political corruption and its impact on the social, economic and political development 
of Malawi.  
3.2 Causes of political corruption in Malawi 
As defined earlier, political corruption entails abuse of power, either for personal gain or for the 
benefit of a group, to which the corrupt person owes allegiance.118 Often it is motivated by 
greed or the desire to retain or increase one’s power.119  According to Gbadamosi, political     
corruption is not a problem sui generis, but merely a symptom of a major problem embedded 
in the “collusive system in which politicians mediate the often contradictory claims of 
capitalism and democracy”.120  Thus, corruption is not a criminal problem but a social problem 
comprising economic, political, and cultural forces.121  While it is manifested in various shapes 
and forms, its gravity depends on the reasons for the corruption and type of office involved.122 
Below are some of the major causes of political corruption in Malawi. 
                                                          
118       Stapenhurst & Sedigh (1999) 1. 
119       Stapenhurst & Sedigh (1999) 5. 
120       Gbadamosi (2006) 4. 
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3.2.1 Poor governance 
Much as there are social, economic and political causes of political corruption, it is argued that 
all those causes are collectively a symptom of failed governance.123 Thus, unlike petty or         
bureaucratic corruption that may prevail over good governance, political corruption thrives on 
poor governance.124 Put differently, all facets of political corruption, such as greed, nepotism, 
and state capture are symptoms of weak governance.  
Johnston & Doig125  define governance as “the use of political authority and the exercise of   
control over society and the management of its resources for social and economic                   
development”.126 Further, they argue that governance comprises: 
“ the nature of functioning of a state’s institutional and structural arrangements,         
decision-making processes, policy formulation, implementation capacity, information 
flows, effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between the rules 
and the ruled.”127 
Thus, governance is the way in which public power and authority are formed and used to      
control and manage society’s resources.128  Good governance, therefore, is said to exist where: 
(a) the public is consulted on government actions that affect them;129 (b) there is transparency 
in the sense that relevant information is accessible to the citizenry at low cost; (c) there is    
predictability of uniform and effective application of clearly stipulated policies, laws and      
                                                          
123      Shah (2007) 235. 
124  Governance and Corruption Baseline Survey: Malawi Final Report (2006) 11. 
125   Johnston & Doig (1999) 15. 
126  Johnston & Droig (1999) 15. 
127  Johnston & Droig (1999) 15. 
128      Governance and Corruption Baseline Survey: Malawi Final Report (2006) 11. 
129  Governance and Corruption Baseline Survey: Malawi Final Report (2006) 11. 
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regulations; and (d) public officials can be called to account for their actions.130 Conversely, 
poor governance reduces the likelihood of exposure and censure for wrongdoing, and thus 
breeds political corruption.131  
Malawi is plagued by poor governance at almost all levels of administration, as is argued by 
Norwegian Ambassador to Malawi, Asbjorn Eidhammer, who said “corruption (in Malawi) is 
more widespread now than 12 years ago. Now you can risk meeting corrupt practices at any 
level (of government).”132 A case in point is weak financial controls133 perpetrated by high-level 
public officials in virtually unaccountable centres of political power.134  For instance, the Report 
of the Auditor General on the Accounts of the Government of the Republic of Malawi for the 
Year ended 30 June, 2011 (Auditor General’s Report)135 exposes serious weaknesses in financial 
controls in almost all ministries and government institutions.136 Among the instances cited by 
the Report is the Ministry of Agriculture’s failure to account for expenditure of approximately 
US$ 5,4 million.137 The main share of this amount represents: (a) US$ 233 589 lost through the     
disappearance of 397 metric tons of fertilizer for a subsidy programme on the way to points of 
                                                          
130      Hope (2000) 19. 
131      Kaufmann & Diminio (2006) 17. 
132  Kumwembe W ‘ACB’s Independence Questioned’ ZODIAK ONLINE, 4 July 2013. 
133      Transparency International ‘Country Study Report: Malawi’ (2004) 23. 
134      Hussein (2005) 92. 
135   National Audit Office, available at http://www.nao.mw (accessed 1 August 2013). 
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delivery;138 (b) US$ 1,4 million lost through unaccounted for farm inputs in the northern region 
of Malawi;139  and (c) unaccounted for payment vouchers amounting to US$ 289 474.140  
Strong political influence on accounting personnel compromises the requisite tight controls on 
public finances.141  Further, as discussed in chapter two, government administration processes 
lack transparency. Worse still, although section 37 of the Constitution guarantees the right of 
access to information, its potential effectiveness is stifled severely by lack of “freedom of        
information” legislation to prescribe detailed rules and an institutional framework pertaining to 
the exercise of the right.142  
Similarly, lack of “declaration of assets” legislation limits the citizens’ capacity to monitor illicit 
enrichment by public officials.143 Thereby, citizens are prevented from enforcing public            
accountability, which is central to good governance.144  Thus, poor governance is the main 
cause of political corruption, and the other causes of corruption thrive on poor governance. 
3.2.2 Abuse of power 
Political corruption is widespread in Malawi because high level public officials enjoy a monopoly 
of power and, as discussed earlier, laws and processes barely are transparent.145 Sometimes 
high public officials can dictate to procurement officers who should be granted procurement 
                                                          
138  Auditor General’s Report (2011) 15. 
139  Auditor General’s Report (2011) 15. 
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141      Transparency International (2004) 23.  
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contracts. Such interventions reasonably would be viewed by the public as motivated by the 
pursuance of private gain.146  Abuse of powers is exemplified in President Joyce Banda’s         
Directive to the Office of the Director of Public Procurement to cancel awards of contracts for 
the procurement of drugs for public hospitals; and the dismissal of public officials deemed to be 
loyal to the former Democratic Progressive Party regime,147 and their replacement with those 
deemed loyal to her and her ruling People’s Party.  
 3.2.3 Politics: A lucrative enterprise 
Malawi is among the world’s poorest countries, ranking 170th of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index.148  About 74 per cent of the population still lives below the income poverty 
line of US$ 1,5 per day.149  The economy is based largely on subsistence farming.150  Hence, 
working in the public sector is seen as a main source of stable income, and access to political 
power or public office is the quickest means to creating opportunities.151  Thus, there is a 
“perception that politics offers the best domestic opportunity for financial gain, and ambitious 
citizens     literally invest in politics”.152  When such politicians get into power they immediately 
                                                          
146  ‘Trust to cancel 4 drug Contracts’ The Daily Times, 8 May 2013. 
147  Bingu wa Mutharika preceded Joyce Banda as president. His political party was the Democratic Progressive 
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148      UNDP ‘Human Development Report: Malawi (2013). 
149      Rural Poverty Portal “Rural poverty in Malawi” available at 
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indulge in corrupt practices to accumulate wealth during their time in power.153 There is the 
phenomenon of “it is our turn to cut a share from the national cake”.154 
3.2.4 Greed 
This paper further argues that political corruption has more to do with greed than the reasons 
of poverty cited earlier. This is because high level public officials are generally remunerated 
well, with lots of privileges attached to their offices.155 Hence, their corrupt behaviour is not 
attributable to low pay or necessity to meet the living expenses of their families. Instead, greed 
and lack of ethical values are major motivating factors.156 Many public officials, thus,    regard 
public service as an opportunity for enriching themselves, their immediate and extended 
families, their friends, as well as a ruling political party.157 For example, former President Bakili 
Muluzi is answering charges of embezzlement for allegedly diverting into his personal account 
£7 million of donor funds meant for the government.158  Similarly, late former President Bingu 
wa Mutharika is alleged to have enriched himself illicitly while in power in that he: (a) built an 
opulent Ndata House in his home district; (b) acquired three houses and had a bank account in 
Singapore; and (c) acquired two presidential flats and maintained a bank account in Australia.159 
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158  Dr Bakili Muluzi v Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau; Hall-Matthews (2007) 88. 
159  Nyirongo E ‘Bingu was worth more than K61 bn’ Nyasa Times, 2 July 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
3.2.5 Patronage and political support 
The corrupt political practice in Malawi is such that once a certain group of political leadership 
assumes power, it immediately starts rewarding those who supported it and its political party 
when they canvassed for power.160 The forms of rewards include lucrative jobs, promotions and 
even the award of lucrative procurement contracts. Priority for this patronage is given to their 
home region, the “home boy syndrome”,161 and the rewards are not based on merit.162 This 
corrupt practice is always detrimental to persons well-deserving and capable of serving the 
government, but not connected to the political authority, and it always involves the subversion 
of laws. A recent example is President Joyce Banda’s firing from office of Malawi’s Reserve Bank 
Governor (Dr Perks Ligoya), the Chief Immigration Officer (Elvis Thodi), the Commissioner   
General for the Malawi Revenue Authority (Lloyd Muhara), the Director of the ACB (Alex 
Nampota), and replacing them with her favourite persons.163   
3.2.6 Manipulation of public procurement   
Political corruption is also rampant in the procurement of goods and services for                     
government.164 This is common in respect of goods such as subsidised fertilizer165 and medical 
drugs, and in the construction industry. Corruption in procurement may occur in three main 
ways. Firstly, there is procurement of services at much-inflated prices in exchange for kickbacks. 
For example, government is accused of building houses, under the “Umoyo Housing Project” in 
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the Ministry of Health, at an exorbitant cost of about US$ 65 000 per house.166  Secondly, the 
services already procured at highly-inflated costs are sub-standard, thereby depriving the     
government of better quality goods and services at more favourable prices offered by fair    
competition.167 Thirdly, contractors may be paid the contract price without rendering the 
services purportedly procured. An example is the Malawi Ministry of Education scam where a 
contract sum of US$2,3 million meant for the construction of school blocks was paid to the 
contractor without even a single block being built.168  
It is also common for public officials to procure goods or services from their own companies or 
sources in which they have an interest, thereby putting themselves in a situation where their 
duty conflicts with their personal interest. An example is the Malawi Clerk of Parliament being 
dragged to court for allegedly flouting procedures when Parliament procured printing and   
photocopying services from the Clerk’s own company.169  
3.2.7 Lack of regulation of political party financing 
In Malawi, as in many African countries, democratic governments fail to distinguish between 
the state and the ruling party.170  Thus, the ruling party monopolises national resources, 
thereby controlling all facets of economic activities. Besides party supporters unlawfully         
enjoying favours on a patronage basis, ruling parties amass unexplainable wealth using national 
resources. For example, the importation of more than 150 vehicles and thousands of t-shirts 
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and caps for former President Bakili Muluzi’s UDF party,171 and the recent acquisition of more 
than 50 vehicles and luxurious coaches by President Joyce Banda’s Peoples’ Party,172 smack of 
abuse of office for party political interests. President Banda claims the source of the property to 
be “undisclosed” well-wishers.173 However, it is alleged that the vehicles were a bribe in          
exchange for lucrative government procurement contracts.174  
Besides the acquisition of property, ruling parties generally survive on national funds and other 
national resources for party political goals, whether during elections campaign periods or not. 
This corruption diverts resources from the common interests of citizens. This corrupt practice is 
worsened by lack of legislation regulating financing of political parties as well as lack of clear 
separation of state and political party functions.175 
3.3 Effects of political corruption in Malawi 
Political corruption in Malawi victimises the poor, the marginalised and the disadvantaged 
more than any other sector of society.176 Put differently, political corruption affects human 
rights such as the rights to health, food, education, equal opportunity to employment and    
economic activity, and also access to justice and other social services.177 Further, it diverts 
scarce national resources, thereby frustrating the implementation of national policies.178 In 
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other words, political corruption in Malawi disables the state from fulfilling its constitutional 
mandate in respect of the protection and promotion of the public interest.179 From a human 
rights perspective, political corruption prevents the State from ensuring maximisation of 
available resources with a view to achieving social and economic rights.180 
“Corrupt management of public resources compromises the government’s ability to    
deliver an array of services, including health, education, and welfare services, which are 
essential for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. Also, the prevalence 
of corruption creates discrimination in access to public services in favour of those able 
to influence the authorities to act in their personal interest, including by offering bribes. 
The economically and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the    
consequences of corruption, because they are particularly dependent on public 
goods.”181  
Political corruption, if unchecked, perpetuates poverty and deprives citizens of access to basic 
social amenities of life such as food, good health and education.  
3.3.1 Poverty and economic inequality 
Corruption motivates public officials to formulate policies in favour of the areas in which they 
know they will benefit corruptly. Thus, the bureaucratic machine will pay more attention to 
projects with corrupt monetary benefit than projects favouring the public interest.182               
The programmes that generate enormous illicit profits for the public officials are, inter alia, the 
Fertilizer Input Subsidy Project, which the Minister of Finance (Ken Lipenga) admitted to be    
                                                          
179   Gathii (2009) 151. 
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infested with hefty corruption,183 and the construction industry. The latter is exemplified by 
projects such as (a) the Umoyo Housing Project where the houses under construction have   
appeared in national budgets for nearly five years, costing the taxpayer exorbitantly, but are 
marred by poor workmanship,184 (b) the approximately 100 km Zomba-Jali road which is yet to 
be completed after US$ 47 million have been spent already, and (c) the three teacher training 
colleges project which has consumed money amounting to US$ 29 million before the            
construction of even a single college.185 
Political corruption thus encourages the inefficient distribution of public resources. Instead of 
focusing on legitimate public problems and needs, the criteria for disbursement of such         
resources are partisanship, nepotism, regionalism and sectarianism, leaving out people with 
legitimate claims to the resources.186 Those left out are the poorest of the poor and the       
powerless.187 This breeds and perpetuates economic inequality.  
The situation is worsened always when the donor community decides to withhold aid because 
of political corruption. For example, when political corruption grew in 2000, the donor 
community reacted strongly. The IMF suspended payments under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility in 2000, followed by the withholding of bilateral budgetary support in 2001.188  
Then the EU, the UK, the USA, and the Danish governments also suspended aid pledged for 
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budgetary support.189  Further, the Danish government withdrew DANIDA from Malawi after 
former   President Bakili Muluzi’s administration embezzled a grant of £5 000.190  Similar abuse 
of public funds occurred during late former President Bingu wa Mutharika’s government, such 
as the   ordering of a £325 000 Maybach as the President’s official vehicle, and the abuse of £75 
000 from the World Bank’s Emergency Drought Recovery Programme to purchase a motor 
vehicle for the former Minister of Agriculture (Gwanda Chakuamba).191  
3.3.2 Escalating unemployment levels 
When government policies favour projects that maximise private gain, little interest is paid to 
public interests such as job creation. This practice, coupled with recruitment of civil servants by 
way of favours rather than merit, results in the escalation of unemployment levels. The recent 
futile government attempts to export labour to Kuwait and South Korea are evidence of the 
growing unemployment rate, and a sign of the lack of clear policies concerning job creation. 
The government, in an attempt to curb the rising unemployment rate, informed the nation that 
arrangements had been finalised for exportation of labour from Malawi to South Korea and 
Kuwait.192 However, the governments of these countries denied the existence of such              
arrangements. 
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The hiring of individuals is governed by nepotism, favouritism, or the offering of financial,      
material or other favours to recruiting authorities.193 Such recruitments are not only               
detrimental to public offices because of compromised qualifications, but also to other           
candidates with qualifications suitable for the job.194 The Nation, for example, observes that 
about 80 percent of high school graduates fail to gain access to tertiary education due to high 
costs, and they go back to their villages with no hope of finding employment.195  
3.3.3 Impact on human rights 
The distribution of patronage results in recruitments and promotions to lucrative public offices, 
as well as the award of high-paying public procurement contracts, not according to merit or 
ethics or professionalism, but according to loyalty to the ruling party and its leadership. This 
results into wastefulness and inefficiency in the delivery of social goods and services in           
Malawi.196  
Further, political corruption diverts public expenditure away from crucial areas such as 
health197 and education.198 The Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau underscored this point 
when he observed that, due to corruption, 30 per cent of government’s budget does not 
finance the intended projects.199  
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In addition, corruption increases the price of administration as a person, most likely a taxpayer, 
is forced to pay more than what the service is worth.200  
3.3.3.1 Health 
President Joyce Banda has been accused of advancing party political agendas in total disregard 
of public policies. For example, at a time when government hospitals have no drugs,201 the 
President is busy mobilising political support for her ruling Peoples’ Party under the guise of   
distributing maize to the rural poor people.202 The Malawi Health Equity Network (MHEN)      
observed, with great concern, that the money the President spends to distribute maize and 
flour could rescue the country’s hospitals, thereby serving millions of Malawians.203 MHEN    
further estimated the cost of one presidential trip at US$ 46 429, while the President donates 
maize worth US$ 1 000.204 This cost of a single trip includes travel allowances for the           
President’s spouse, council chief executive officers, senior political party members, television 
crew, Ministers and Members of Parliament, as well as security officers.205 
3.3.3.2 Education 
Like the health sector, the education field is affected severely by political corruption. It has 
been plagued by procurement scams, among them (a) the £1,9 million supply of exercise books 
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scam,206 (b) the £935 000 scam in respect of uncompleted school buildings,207 and (c) the       
unaccounted for US$ 29 million meant for the construction of teacher training colleges.208      
The effects of corruption on education include a serious shortage of classrooms, with the             
consequence of children having to learn in the open.209 All this may be attributed to political 
corruption, where the elite concentrates on projects, such as the fertilizer input subsidy        
programme, that make them consolidate political power at the expense of education.            
The fertilizer subsidy programme is fertile ground for political corruption, where procurement 
contracts are issued, on a patronage basis, to relations, business partners and political           
supporters.210  
Political corruption thus affects the quality of education in Malawi.211  Recently, teachers staged 
industrial strikes over low salaries, and consequently primary school pupils took to the streets 
in an attempt to safeguard their right to education, when the government did not show any 
interest in addressing the teachers’ grievances.212 
3.3.4 Widespread corruption 
Political corruption inevitably leads to corruption in other spheres of life, either by design,     
example or by the failure of political leadership to implement and effectively enforce            
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anti-corruption measures, including transparency and accountability.213 Put differently, political 
corruption can breed impunity. It erodes the impetus necessary to adhere to ethical values. 
Thus, when corruption goes unpunished it exerts a corrupting influence on other members of 
the administrative apparatus.214 This results in widespread corruption at almost all levels of 
government.215 
3.3.5 Loss of revenue 
Political corruption also negatively infringes on revenues in several ways. Firstly, when            
corruption takes the form of kickbacks, it diminishes government revenue since part of the 
revenue is diverted from public purposes into private ones.216 Secondly, political corruption   
affects efforts to collect maximum revenues from taxable imports, taxable income from natural 
resources, as well as other business profits.217 According to Transparency International,218 the 
Malawi Revenue Authority is selective in the application of tax laws. There is evidence of        
political influence in the Authority’s enforcement decisions, with favours being given to          
politicians or individuals who have family or friends in high level government leadership.219    
Importation of fleets of motor vehicles by former President Bakili Muluzi220 and the late former     
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President Bingu wa Mutharika221 duty free, allegedly for personal use, illustrates abuse of      
office, resulting in loss of revenue.  
Thirdly, political corruption is faulted for loss of revenue from the mining industry.222 A case in 
point concerns tax incentives which the Malawi government gave an Australian mining        
company, Paladin Energy Limited, for uranium mining. The mining contractual agreement, 
which is currently under intense criticism, gives Malawi only a 15 per cent local stake in the   
project. There is public demand that the contract, which has resulted in huge loss of revenue, 
be renegotiated for the public benefit.223 The government’s reluctance to renegotiate the     
contract smacks of political corruption, as it is alleged that the Vice President was soliciting 
bribes from the mining company.224 The fourth example is the recent sale by the Malawi 
Housing Corporation of government houses to senior public officers and politicians at heavily 
discounted prices, resulting in loss of revenue.225 
3.3.6 Erosion of democratic values  
This is reflected in the use of government resources by a ruling party for party political gains, 
for example, the mobilisation of political support through the distribution of maize flour        
disguised as a relief programme. This is to the disadvantage of the opposition political parties 
who have limited financial resources. The abuse is not limited to election campaign periods, but 
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includes corrupt practices outside the campaign periods, such as bribing Members of              
Parliament elected on a ticket of an opposition political party to leave the party and join the 
ruling party.226  This is tantamount to ignoring the interests of the electorate in pursuit of      
private gain.227 These corrupt practices defeat the constitutional safeguards for democratic 
governance.  
3.4 Summary 
The level of political corruption in Malawi is alarming as it is widespread, benefiting high level 
public officials. Mostly, political corruption involves subversion of laws for private gain. The gain 
may be personal or for a group such as a political party or personal relations and friends of the 
public official. 
Much as it is widespread, political corruption is especially prevalent in government                
procurement of both goods and services. This is where persons deemed loyal to the public    
official, are either employed in or promoted to lucrative positions, or are awarded high value 
procurement contracts. All this is aimed at strengthening the grip on political leadership and, of 
course, is detrimental to the deserving but politically unconnected. 
Political corruption has a serious negative impact on the public interest. It threatens the rule of 
law, democracy and human rights. It affects the poor seriously, especially in undermining the 
rights to health, education, and equal opportunity to economic activity and employment.       
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Restoring good governance is the only way to combat political corruption, thereby ensuring the 
implementation of public policies that favour the public interest.                                                                                                                                                                                         
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CHAPTER 4 
OBSTACLES TO COMBATING POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite the existence of legislative instruments ranging from the Constitution, through the   
Public Finance Management Act and the Public Procurement Act, to the CPA, combating         
political corruption in Malawi seems an insurmountable task. Further, this perception persists 
despite the existence of the ACB and other governance institutions.  
This chapter explores the major obstacles to effective enforcement of the anti-corruption 
measures. The obstacles include breach of constitutional prescriptions of transparency,           
accountability and financial probity; lack of laws regulating (a) access to information,                
(b) political party financing, and (c) declarations of assets by public officials; operational          
independence of the law enforcement authorities; lack of social accountability mechanisms; 
political interference; and absence of political will.  
4.2 Lack of political will and its effects 
The adoption of laws which endeavour to prevent and criminalise corruption widely is        
meaningless in the absence of the requisite political will to implement them.228 As regards     
“political will”, Kpundeh defines it as “the demonstrated credible intent of political actors 
(elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc) to attack      
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perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level”.229 Further, it has been suggested 
that combating political corruption in a sustained manner requires a consistent demonstration 
of genuine commitment on the part of high-level public officials towards the eradication of the 
pandemic.230  As noted earlier, political power in most poor countries is seen as the main and 
quick gateway to wealth.231  Unless a political leadership is ethically upright, reforms that would 
redistribute wealth effectively, for example, improved governance and resource allocation    
systems, are bound to fail.232   
For Malawi, lack of political will to combat political corruption is self-evident. For example, 
since its adoption two decades ago, government is yet to implement the good governance 
measures prescribed by the Constitution. The measures are aimed, inter alia, at enhancing    
participatory democracy, transparency, accountability and financial probity.233 As it were, the 
Constitution is observed more in the breach than in compliance. The resultant effects of lack of 
political will include (a) progressive erosion of participatory democratic governance,                 
(b) breakdown of the rule of law, and (c) entrenched political corruption.234  
This paper argues that the lack of political will is the source of all obstacles to effective           
implementation of the anti-corruption measures. This lack of political will exhibits itself in the 
legal and non-legal obstacles discussed below. 
                                                          
229  Kpundeh (1999) 92. 
230  Abdulai (2009) 16.  
231   Snider & Kidane (2007) 695.  
232  Mbaku (2007) 359. 
233  Sections 12(1) and 13(o) of the Constitution. See also Article 5(1) of UNCAC.  
234  Christensen J “Africa’s Lost Tax Revenue, Lost Development Opportunities” available at 
http://www.Concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/issue87/christensen/ (accessed 22 February 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
4.2.1 Legal obstacles: Impediments to good governance 
For Malawi, the efficacy and legitimacy of anti-corruption measures, like any law, are derived 
from the Constitution.235 Further, both the efficacy and legitimacy of anti-corruption measures 
are derived from their compliance with fundamental constitutional principles of transparency, 
accountability and financial probity.236   
As noted in chapter three, all facets of political corruption are symptoms of weak 
governance.237 It follows, therefore, that anti-corruption initiatives fall within the ambit of good      
governance, which, in turn, mutually reinforces and overlaps with constitutional principles such 
as public participation, transparency and accountability.238 Below are legal obstacles to an      
effective fight against political corruption in Malawi. 
4.2.1.1 Secrecy and lack of access to information 
Despite the constitutional prescription of the right of access to information,239 Malawi does not 
have enabling legislation for the right.240 There has been an inordinate delay in enacting into 
law the Access to Information Bill that was drafted in 2003.241 The right of access to information 
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is a crucial tool for political participation.242 Neuman aptly states that “knowledge is power, and 
transparency is the remedy to the darkness under which corruption and abuse thrives”.243  
Ocheje adds that the more public administration, public procurement, and general public      
resource management are secretive, the more it becomes a breeding ground for corrupt      
practices.244  
In this regard, section 37 of the Constitution entitles every person to access to “all information 
held by the State or any of its organs at any level of Government”. With reference to sections 
12 and 13 of the Constitution, the information includes that pertaining to (a) management of 
public finances, (b) hiring of public officials, and (c) public administration and decision-making 
processes. The access to information would benefit the citizenry in several ways. Firstly, it 
would enhance meaningful participation in democratic processes, as only an informed populace 
can participate effectively in governance.245  Secondly, it would expose nepotism, clientelism, 
unfair treatment in recruitment of public officials and public procurement, and corruption in 
general,246 and hold the government to account.247 Lastly, information would empower both 
civil society and the media to disseminate accurate information to the citizenry, rather than 
mere speculation.248  
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In summary, the right of access to information, which reinforces freedom of expression, is a 
prerequisite for encouraging public accountability and the punishment of corruption.249          
Accordingly, lack of access to information in Malawi is an obstacle to the effective fight against 
corruption, since deterrence of corruption is by way of transparency and the accountability of 
public officials and their respective institutions.250 
4.2.1.2 Lack of enforcement of law on declaration of assets 
It has been argued that effective corruption control requires that public officials, whether 
elected or appointed, declare their assets upon taking office and periodically thereafter, and 
whenever their assets change significantly.251 The declaration of assets is regarded as a most 
important tool for preventing corruption.252 It is aimed, inter alia, at promoting transparency, 
public accountability, financial probity and trust, and most importantly, guarding against illicit 
enrichment.253  
In Malawi, the Constitution requires the Presidency, members of cabinet, members of            
Parliament, and other senior public officials to declare their assets, liabilities and business      
interests within three months of their appointment or election to office.254 The declarations 
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have to be made to the office of the Speaker of Parliament. However, the constitutional          
requirement has not been implemented yet, and if any declarations have been made at all, no 
one has had access to the information.255  The Speaker has refused to make public any            
declarations, arguing that the law does not mandate him to do so.256  
Non-implementation of the constitutional requirement smacks of lack of political will to fight 
corruption. This paper argues that even if the requirement were met, it hardly would have     
enhanced accountability, on three grounds. Firstly, the Constitution does not prescribe        
mandatory verification of the declarations by the office of the Speaker. This lacuna in the law is 
prone to abuse, as targeted public officials can fake declarations without being detected.      
Secondly, the law prescribes no punishment for defaulting public officials. Lastly, the law does 
not provide for accountability of public officials after leaving office. Chêne opines that a         
successful law must have: (a) clarity as to assets, liabilities and interests targeted,                      
(b) a mandatory requirement for verification of declared assets, (c) effective sanctions for law 
defaulters, and (d) public access to officials’ declarations.257  
In an apparent attempt to address the lacuna in the Constitution, Malawi has drafted a “Public 
Officers (Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and Business Interests) Bill, 2013 (Declaration of       
Assets Bill)”,258 aimed at addressing the gap in the legal framework. This paper argues that if 
                                                          
255  Patel et al (2007) 28.  
256  Lee R ‘No one knows what politicians own’ OSISA, 3 November 2011. 
257  Chêne M “African experience of asset declarations” (2008) 2, available at 
http://www.u4.no/publications/african-experience-of-asset-declarations/  (accessed 30 June 2013). 
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enacted into law, the Bill will not achieve the intended purpose due to lack of operational      
independence of the prescribed authority. 
For example, the President will have the power to appoint the Director and Deputy Director of 
the institution responsible for asset declarations.259 Although the appointments will be subject 
to confirmation by the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament (PAC),260 both the      
President and PAC will ensure that the appointee serves their political interests. Worse still, the 
Bill prescribes, pursuant to section 213(4) of the Constitution, an oversight committee          
comprising members of Parliament.261 In addition, the Bill restricts public access to declarations 
by requiring that the citizenry apply to the Director for access to the information, and the       
Director has absolute discretion whether to deny or grant access to the declarations.262  
Of further concern is that sections 18 and 19 of the Bill avoid addressing procedure for removal 
from office of the President and members of Parliament. The law, therefore, should be           
interfaced with provisions of the Constitution and Standing Orders of Parliament that prescribe 
the removal from office of the President263 and members of Parliament.264   
This paper argues that this Bill is a sham, aimed at hoodwinking the citizenry and the               
international community into believing that Malawi is desirous of stamping out political 
corruption. The      tentacles of politics have to be removed from the Bill. That is to say, (a) 
                                                          
259  Section 7(1) of the Declaration of Assets Bill. 
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appointments and monitoring functions should be executed by persons independent of politics; 
(b) declarations have to be effectively verified, and made readily accessible to the public; (c) 
defaulting public officials, including members of the Presidency, ought to be prosecuted, 
punished and removed from public office; and (d) accountability should be enforced at the time 
of leaving office. Absent these conditions, the law will be another paper tiger.    
4.2.1.3 Abuse of excessive discretionary powers and lack of accountability 
 The President of the Republic of Malawi has excessive discretionary powers which are prone to 
abuse in the absence of effective mechanisms of accountability. Section 89 of the Constitution 
empowers the President to make appointments as may be necessary and in accordance with 
constitutional powers or pursuant to an Act of Parliament. The President thus has powers, inter 
alia, to appoint the Director of Public Prosecutions,265 and the Director and Deputy Director of 
the ACB. As noted in chapter two, the Constitution prescribes a system of checks and balances 
for the effective separation of powers among the branches of government, to ensure that each 
branch operates within its designated ambit of authority.266  However, as exemplified in the 
appointment and dismissal of Directors of the ACB, there is lack of efficacy in the               
accountability mechanism. Thus, in pursuance of enhancing the grip on leadership power, the 
President can appoint persons considered loyal to him and the ruling party. The appointments 
are, in most cases, not based on merit. 
                                                          
265  Sections 100 and 101 of the Constitution. 
266  Nkhata MJ “Origins and Historical Development of the Constitution” 13, available at 
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 This conduct breeds impunity among public officials deemed close to the Presidency. 267 For 
example, instead of corrupt public officials being held to account, they are rewarded with either 
non-removal from the ministry, or relocation to another ministry. Cases in point include the   
following: (a) Ken Lipenga, after pocketing travel allowances as Labour Minister for a trip that 
was not made,268 was promoted to head the Ministry of Finance where he was involved in two 
corruption scandals concerning (i) unlawful borrowing of money from banks and disguising it as 
revenue duly collected by the government revenue agency (Malawi Revenue Authority),269 and 
(ii) the recent “Capital Hill cash gate” scandal involving massive theft of public funds by public 
officials through the Treasury;270  (b) Friday Jumbe was promoted from heading the Agricultural 
Department and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) to Minister of Finance at a time when he 
was being investigated for allegedly fraudulently selling government maize reserves and     
pocketing £14,5 million;271 and (c) Messrs Goodall Gondwe and Patricia Kaliati retained their 
ministerial positions while being investigated on serious corruption allegations concerning    
procurement of government subsidised fertilizer, and the award of the Vwaza-Nyika Marsh   
Eco-Tourism concession, respectively.272 This practice breeds impunity and perpetuates political 
corruption. 
Further, it is common cause that parliamentary committees, such as the Public Accounts and 
Public Appointments Committees, are aimed at providing a check on the functions of the       
                                                          
267  Auditor General’s Report (2011). 
268  Hall-Matthews (2007) 86. 
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executive branch.273 And, effectiveness depends on representation in the Committees, that is to 
say, unless a Committee is represented by members of Parliament from all political parties    
represented in Parliament, a Committee dominated by the ruling party will advance a party   
political agenda above public interests.274  
4.2.1.4 Lack of legislation regulating political party funding 
Transparency International observes that an important area where Malawi’s legal framework is 
inadequate is in the regulation of political party funding.275 There are currently no laws limiting 
or regulating individual or corporate political contributions. Further, and worse still, there is no 
requirement for disclosure of donations to political parties or audits of political parties or     
candidates.276  As a result, political parties are noted mysteriously to amass wealth immediately 
upon assuming leadership. 
 Further, the lacuna in the law perpetuates the abuse of public resources by the ruling elite, for 
party political objectives.277 By way of example, both former Presidents Bakili Muluzi and the 
                                                          
273  Parliament of Malawi “Committee Systems” available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.mw/committees.pho?mode=ct  (accessed 30 August 2013).  
274  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace “Parliamentary Audit of the First Hundred Days of the 2009-2014 
Parliament”, available at 
http://www.episcopalconferencemalawi.files.worldpress.com/2010/09/parliamntary-audit-of-the-first-
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275  “Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Malawi” (2012), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/139_Overview-of_corruption_and_anti-
corruption-in-Malawi.pdf  (accessed 20 March 2013). 
276  Business Anti-Corruption Portal “Snapshot of the Malawi Country Profile”, available at 
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(accessed 20 March 2013). 
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late Bingu wa Mutharika abused public resources for party political functions.278  Similarly, the 
current President Joyce Banda is benefiting from the abuse of public resources, as discussed in 
chapter three.279  
4.2.1.5 Politicisation of law enforcement 
As noted in chapter two, political meddling in the operations of law enforcement authorities 
obstructs the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s efficiency, undermines the rule of law and breeds 
impunity. The Director of the ACB is politically appointed and required to be accountable to the 
political offices of the President and the Minister of Justice.280 Further, the requirement that 
the ACB seek consent from the DPP before prosecuting a corruption case, compromises its 
operational independence.281 As observed in chapter two, consent can be denied, or cases 
discontinued, on political grounds.  
It is thus a challenge for Director of the ACB to enforce the law against his political masters at 
whose mercy lies his security of tenure.282 A case in point is the termination of the employment 
of Director Gilton Chiwaula by former President Bakili Muluzi when the ACB insisted on      
prosecuting some Ministers in his administration, and the appointment of his replacement,    
Michael Mtegha.283 Similarly, Michael Mtegha was fired from office by late former President 
                                                          
278  Transparency International Country Study Report: Malawi (2004) 17. See also Hall-Mattews (2007) 88. 
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280  Section 10(4) of the CPA. 
281 Section 42 of the CPA. 
282  Transparency International Country Study Report: Malawi (2004) 11. 
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October 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika, and replaced by Gustav Kaliwo.284 In turn, Gustav Kaliwo was fired later 
for arresting former President Bakili Muluzi for corruption offences.285 Likewise, Alex Nampota, 
who replaced Gustav Kaliwo, was fired by President Joyce Banda, and replaced with Justice 
Rezine Mzikamanda.286   
Although the Corrupt Practices Act prescribes procedure for recruitment and termination of 
employment of the Director of the ACB, the practicality of the law is a challenge.287 
Considerations of who to recruit and whether or not to fire the incumbent are not meritorious, 
but based on political power.288 When recruited, therefore, the Directors are inclined more to 
serving the interests of their political master than the public interest.289  
To curb this mischief, there is a need to amend the CPA to enhance effective performance of 
the ACB by freeing it from political meddling in its operations. In other words, the law should 
grant the ACB and any other anti-corruption watchdogs exclusive investigatory and 
prosecutorial powers.290  This would require amending the CPA to (a) prescribe a competitive 
recruitment process for the Director and Deputy Director of the ACB, preferably by a politically 
neutral body or a body representing all political parties,291 (b) remove the current requirement 
                                                          
284  Hall-Matthews (2007) 81. 
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for the       Director to report to the President and the Minister of Justice,292 (c) prescribe and 
safeguard security of tenure of the Director and Deputy Director whose removal from office 
should     comply with due process principles,293 (d) remove the requirement of seeking consent 
from the DPP to prosecute corruption cases,294 and (e)  provide for public officials under 
investigation to leave office, in order to pave the way for thorough investigations into the 
allegations against them. 
Further, an ideal situation would be that the CPA prescribes the establishment of a politically 
neutral watchdog institution to oversee the functions of the ACB. Besides reporting to 
Parliament, the ACB should be accountable to an independent body for its functions. This 
would curb abuse of the ACB by the ruling elite for selfish political interests. 
4.2.2 Non-legal obstacles: Legitimacy of the rule of law 
The legal obstacles discussed above constitute major impediments to combating political      
corruption. However, the legal reasons are the tip of the iceberg. As persuasively argued by 
Gbadamosi, corruption is not a criminal problem per se, but a social problem comprising      
economic, political and cultural forces.295  
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4.2.2.1 Politics of the rule of law 
Malawi is a liberal democracy with a liberal democratic Constitution.296 The Constitution has 
arguably good anti-corruption principles of transparency, accountability and financial probity 
which represent the rule of law. However, persistent breach of the Constitution by public      
officials, as noted earlier, exposes a missing link between the anti-corruption measures and 
their effective implementation. The breach of the founding principles of the Constitution is a 
symptom of the breakdown of the rule of law. 
The enactment of the Constitution of 1994 was an expression of the nation’s desire to embrace 
democracy. However, according to Kanyongolo, the Constitution was imposed on Malawian 
society, as the process of enactment lacked serious consultation.297 The lack of consultation 
deprived the Constitution of legitimacy and, as will be discussed below, lack of legitimacy may 
explain the persistent breach of the Constitution by Malawi leadership. 
Further, Bukovansky contends that good policies and laws are only a means to achieve an end, 
and their successful implementation is dependent upon the existence of a suitable milieu which 
legitimises the anti-corruption measures, thereby making them pragmatic and self-enforcing.298 
As noted above, the Malawi Constitution faces serious implementation challenges due to lack 
of the requisite normative force. This is exemplified in the following observations. 
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 Firstly, it is trite to note that no matter how good legislation may appear on paper, its efficacy 
is always dependent on whether the law attains normative legitimacy in a society.299 In other 
words, the society has to appreciate the need for the law, and reach a consensus to implement 
it. Appreciation of the need for the law requires consultation.300 Consultation entails working 
with leadership and the citizenry in identifying common grounds and areas in need of 
modifications to conform to domestic situations. This is, however, normally done with leaders 
who derive authority from society, as legitimacy of the laws and reforms cannot be gained from 
society and leadership in the absence of substantive consultation. Therefore, it has been said 
that the Constitution lacks legitimacy because it was imposed on Malawi society.301 The Malawi 
leadership and society were not engaged to appreciate the benefits of abandoning the culture 
of secrecy prevalent during the dictatorial regime and adopting a culture of transparency. This 
paper argues that this affects seriously the enforcement of constitutional law pertaining to 
corruption, for example, the right of access to information. This breakdown of the rule of law 
promotes secrecy in government operations and perpetuates political corruption.  
It is argued that since corruption is all about perception, Malawi society ought to determine 
what constitutes corruption and how to combat it. The role of the international community 
must, therefore, be to assist the society with information on the dangers of corruption and how 
it can be curbed in furtherance of public interests. The social consensus on the evils of 
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corruption and its impact on society translate into sophisticated checks and balances on the 
exercise of public power and stiff legal sanctions for transgressors of corruption laws.302 In 
Malawi, political corruption and corruption generally are on the rise, endemic, and 
uncontrollable due to a lack of social consensus. As instructively put, lack of congruence 
between the lofty goal of the law and the social and political reality prevalent in a society 
renders the law ineffective.303  
Secondly, it has been suggested elsewhere that the Western anti-corruption framework, which 
advocates operational independence for law enforcement institutions of government, cannot 
be feasible without modification in the light of the political spectrum of Malawi.304 Institutions 
such as the ACB cannot function effectively unless the Western concepts of its functions are 
modified to attain the societal normative values. Accordingly, it is recommended that the 
external concept of corruption and the requisite anti-corruption measures need enculturation 
for them to attain legitimacy.305 Imposition of the liberal-rationalistic principles of good 
governance portrays the African concept of governance as corrupt and in need of Western 
solution.306 Imposition of the constitutional anti-corruption measures on Malawi society thus 
lacks legitimacy. The citizenry, upon whom the Constitution bestows power to regulate political 
governance, has not conceptualised its power and the need to hold public officials to account. 
Also, the leadership does not appreciate why it (a) has to be accountable for its policies to the 
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citizenry, (b) has to be transparent and allow the populace access to information, and (c) has to 
protect and promote equal access to public resources and opportunities to economic activities. 
Thirdly, to combat political corruption and general corruption successfully, it is imperative to 
instil in Malawi society the normative perspective of the rule of law. This point of view is 
premised on people’s regard for the law as both just and moral, and not necessarily as good for 
private interests.307 It is, therefore, essential to legitimise the law so that people should obey it 
not out of fear of punishment, but because of belief in its legitimacy. The law attains legitimacy 
when it is deemed morally just and the lawmaker is considered to have the equitable right to 
regulate behaviour.308 Focus, therefore, should be on enculturation and consolidation of 
democracy (public interest, fairness transparency, accountability, access to information, etc). 
Reforms should, as a result, focus on structural changes, that is, formulate anti-corruption 
measures in a way that a society will accept them as necessary to serve its interests.309 
4.2.2.2 Misplaced reasons for law reform 
 This paper opines that another obstacle to combating corruption is the focus on “good 
governance” in the sense that good governance promotes foreign investment.310 However, 
others have argued that reforms should focus centrally on equitable allocation of domestic 
resources.311 Unfortunately, the Western concept of corruption, its causes and effects on 
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society are disconnected from the realities of life in African communities.312 Thus, corruption 
must be contextualised in relation to national and societal conditions. Reforms should not be 
premised on the “Western best practice”, but on the fundamental needs of the society 
concerned.  
In Malawi, the donor community, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have been working on 
law reform with the ACB, focusing on strengthening law enforcement and trying to secure 
operational independence for the ACB. The reforms have failed so far to produce results due to 
what could be termed a wrong focus. It is erroneous to think that national development is 
dependent on “political stability and democratisation and liberalisation of business 
processes”.313 Instead, focus should be on the domestic conception of development, which in 
the Malawian context comprises basic and fundamental human requirements such as access to 
good health, education, equitable access to economic opportunities, and access to 
information.314 
In addition, it has been contended that any reforms that neglect the unique national 
characteristics (such as cultural divergence) and conditions which are determinant of the 
practical viability and reasonableness of reforms are bound to fail.315  It is suggested, therefore, 
that the approach to a successful fight against corruption ought to comprise a critical 
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framework that is cognisant of broader societal contexts and conditions as well as the interests 
earmarked for protection.316 
4.3 Lack of social accountability 
The prevailing traditional theory of accountability is what may be called a “top-to-bottom 
approach” to consolidating accountability systems and calling leaders to account.317 In Malawi, 
as in any other underdeveloped societies, where culture and traditions are quite important 
influences upon governance systems, there may be need for a bottom-to-top approach towards 
strengthening accountability.318 
According to Schouten, the World Bank has recognised this bottom-to-top approach as 
effective and necessary in addressing accountability under the concept of “social 
accountability”.319 This theory is an initiative that relies on civic engagement, whereby ordinary 
citizens participate directly or indirectly in holding public officials to account. It is common 
cause that political corruption involves high-level public officials who are supposed to be 
guardians of the law. Thus, they cannot enforce the law against their selfish interests. The 
bottom-to-top approach, therefore, would be the only effective tool for combating political 
corruption. However, for this to succeed there would be a need first to address the cultural 
challenges of Malawi society to legitimise the need to combat political corruption regardless of 
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the social status of the perpetrator. In other words, there is need to incentivise the citizenry to 
have the impetus for holding leaders to account, rather than just focusing on personal survival, 
due to poverty.320  
For Malawi society, like many African societies, strengthening the bottom-to-top approach 
towards accountability requires raising public awareness regarding the evils of corruption and 
its impact on the society.321 This awareness-raising is what Indira Carr calls “re-socialisation”.322 
Carr emphasises the need to make the society aware of the debilitating effects of corruption on 
its socio-economic welfare.323 She further states that this public awareness campaign should be 
conducted by politically neutral bodies such as non-governmental organisations, civil society 
organisations and activists.324 Besides public awareness, UNCAC recommends that States 
Parties introduce public education programmes into school curricula in order to widen the 
spectrum of the anti-corruption campaign. 
Once people appreciate the ill effects of political corruption, its impact on the society, and what 
role the citizenry can play to curb it, they will condemn corrupt practices regardless of the 
status of the perpetrator. In other words, when the people perceive threats to their sources of 
livelihood and fundamental human rights (wealth, good health, education, employment, etc) 
they become willing to take effective steps to defend themselves at whatever cost.325 Thus, the 
citizens’ preparedness to defend their rights constitutes deterrence of the public officials from 
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indulging in corrupt practices, for fear of adverse citizen reaction.326 The citizen reaction 
includes voting leadership out of office, and ensuring that corrupt officials are investigated, 
prosecuted and duly punished, regardless of social status or ethnic background.327 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has shown that there are various obstacles to successful enforcement of anti-
corruption measures. The major impediments in the implementation of the law, including the 
Constitution, are lack of political will and lack of legitimacy of the law. The law that attains 
societal legitimacy becomes self-enforcing, as the citizenry feels obliged to protect and promote 
the law, not for fear of punishment but in pursuance of the public interest. 
Thus, it is normatively imperative to engage the society in conceptualising political corruption 
and corruption generally in order to succeed in the fight against the pandemic. Put differently, 
every society is governed by normative values, and for any reforms to be successful they must 
reflect the values of the particular society. Involvement of the citizenry in law enforcement 
therefore requires a well informed society. Any anti-corruption drive, therefore, must 
commence with educating the society about the evils of corruption and demonstrating that it 
requires every person’s effort to curb it. 
For Malawi, lack of normative legitimacy of the existing legal framework has translated into 
resistance to implementation of good governance measures, and inordinate delays in enacting 
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requisite legislation for the regulation of, inter alia, access to information, declarations of 
assets, and political party financing. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper has sought to examine the major obstacles to combating political corruption in 
Malawi in the light of the international and Malawi’s anti-corruption legal frameworks. 
Corruption is a global problem, and due to its complexity and the serious impact that it has on 
the international community, particularly poor countries, combating it requires concerted 
global efforts. This is what motivated the international community to adopt various 
international anti-corruption legal instruments such as UNCAC, the AU Convention, and the 
SADC Protocol. Although the legal instruments target corruption both in the private and public 
sectors, the focus is on combating corruption in the public sector. Malawi is a State Party to the 
three legal instruments identified above, besides having a national anti-corruption legal 
framework. 
Surprisingly, despite the anti-corruption legal framework, political corruption specifically and 
general corruption have been on the rise in Malawi. Political corruption is the worst kind of 
corruption for Malawi, one of the poorest countries in the world. It involves mostly high-level 
public officials, those with authority to develop national policies, enact laws, and ensure 
effective enforcement of the law. Its impact on the social and economic welfare of the 
populace, particularly the majority poor people in rural areas of the country, is massive. The 
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effects include lack of access to food, good health and education facilities, and equitable access 
to economic activities.     
The main cause of political corruption is poor governance, which is manifested in greed, 
nepotism, patronage and state capture. Political corruption is prevalent and systemic in Malawi 
because public officials lack the political will to combat it. The lack of political will is motivated 
by pursuit of wealth and a strong grip on power in political leadership. That is to say, (a) the 
recruitment and promotion to lucrative public offices, and award of high-value procurement 
contracts to persons deemed loyal to the leadership, and (b) the general abuse of public 
resources, operate in practice for private gain and to the detriment of the public interest. To 
achieve this, public officials will ensure that the citizenry is incapacitated from active 
participation in democratic governance by depriving them of information pertinent to 
enforcement of good governance.    
The strategy for combating political corruption, therefore, is to avoid focusing narrowly on law 
and institutional reforms based on the Western concept of good governance. Rather, emphasis 
ought to be placed on the establishment and strengthening of social accountability through 
new methods of active participatory governance. Efficacy in social accountability will eventually 
breed political leadership with the political will befitting the changing needs and aspirations of 
the Malawi citizenry, and national values that will ensure a viable future. This can be achieved 
with a citizenry well-informed of (a) its rights to equitable access to public resources, and the 
duties of the government leadership, (b) the evils of political corruption and corruption in 
general, and their impact on its rights, and (c) the urgent need for concerted efforts of the 
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citizens themselves to combat corruption at all levels. To achieve this feat will require reforms 
and technical assistance as recommended below.  
5.2 Recommendations 
Besides the solutions already offered in chapter four, this paper proposes the                             
recommendations which follow. These recommendations recognise the fact that effective   
anti-corruption measures require a symbiotic relationship between legislative measures and 
non-legal measures; and that political will cannot be achieved and sustained only upon 
enhancement of social (bottom-to-top) accountability.  
5.2.1 Building social accountability mechanisms 
This paper recommends implementation of Article 13 of UNCAC which prescribes participation 
of civil society in the fight against corruption by raising public awareness regarding the evils of 
corruption and its impact on the society. This concept of re-socialisation328 was discussed           
extensively in chapter four. 
The concept of re-socialisation ought to be implemented in two ways. Firstly, it should involve 
public awareness campaigns by politically neutral bodies such as non-governmental                
organisations, civil society organisations and activists.329 Secondly, the Malawi government 
should introduce public education programmes into school curricula in order to widen the   
spectrum of the anti-corruption campaign. Once the populace appreciates the ill effects of     
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political corruption, its impact on the society, and what role the citizenry can play to curb it, it 
will condemn and fight corrupt practices regardless of the status of the perpetrator. That is to 
say, corrupt practices will be considered normatively evil regardless of the social status of the 
perpetrator. Public officials, in turn, will perceive the high cost of indulging in corruption,       
including removal from office, prosecution, and deprivation of illicitly gained property.330      
Consequently, public officials will choose to pursue good governance for fear of adverse citizen 
reaction.331  
 5.2.2 Enactment of access to information legislation 
This paper advocates the enactment of an access to information law for enforcement of the 
constitutional right of access to information.332 This law is fundamental to the pursuit of social 
accountability through the concept of re-socialisation. With information, the populace will   
participate fully in the democratic governance of the Republic of Malawi.333 
5.2.3 Law on declarations of assets 
An effective fight against political corruption requires measures to ensure that public officials 
declare their assets and liabilities before they assume public office. This is aimed, inter alia, at 
curbing illicit enrichment. This paper recommends the enactment of legislation for the           
enforcement of sections 88A and 213 of the Constitution. The law ought to permit public access 
                                                          
330  Treisman (2000) 404. 
331  Ocheje (2011) 264. 
332  Section 37 of the Constitution. 
333  Sections 12 and 37 of the Constitution. See also Neuman (2002) 5. 
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to records of declarations made by public officials. This recommendation was discussed in 
detail in chapter four.    
5.2.4 Regulation of political party funding 
This paper further advocates the enactment of legislation to regulate political party funding. 
The law would curb the abuse of public resources by ruling parties that run party political    
business using public resources. Thus, the law ought to prescribe declarations of political party 
funding from any source, mandatory auditing of political party accounts, and clear separation 
between state and party functions. 
5.2.5 Technical assistance 
This paper strongly recommends that the donor community participating actively in              
anti-corruption law reform in Malawi should refocus its attention towards mobilisation of a   
vibrant civil society for an outreach programme. This recommendation is derived from the    
recommendation to build and strengthen social accountability through the concept of              
re-socialisation. Effective implementation of re-socialisation would require a buoyant civil      
society that will take the anti-corruption message to the rural communities. There would be 
need for adequate resources and training to ensure fruitful results. 
Further, technical assistance would be required for the introduction of anti-corruption subjects 
into primary, secondary and tertiary education curricula. 
In summary, therefore, this paper argues that unless concrete solutions are found for the       
obstacles to combating political corruption, Malawi will forever languish in the dungeon of     
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abject poverty. That is to say, political corruption will keep rising, with two consequences for 
the society. On the one hand, the politically connected few will have unlimited access to public 
resources such as good education and good health services, as well as wealth and unqualified 
opportunities for economic activities. On the other hand, the majority of the citizenry in rural 
areas will remain poor, without access to education, good health-care services, or to economic 
opportunities such as employment and business. This abject poverty will pass from generation 
to generation.  
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